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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Brixen & Christopher Architects, P.C. concurs with the State that jurisdiction is proper 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996) and that this is an appeal from the 
decision of Judge Lewis of the district court dismissing a civil investigative demand 
("CID") issued by the Attorney General to Brixen & Christopher. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Was the material presented to the district court (i.e. the affidavit of L. Del 
Mortensen), taken as a whole, sufficient objective evidence to establish reasonable 
cause to believe there has been an antitrust violation or that Brixen & Christopher 
Architects, P.C. was in possession of information pertaining thereto? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Brixen & Christopher concurs with the standard of review as set out by the 
State. The appellate court "will review the district court's decision for correctness 
while affording a 'measure of discretion' to that court in [its] application of the 
correctness standard to a given set of facts." Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177, 197 (Utah 
1998) (citing State v. Hodson, 907 P.2d 1155, 1157 (Utah 1995); State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1994)). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Appellee does not believe that there are any constitutional provisions, 
statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations which are determinative of the appeal or of 
central importance to the appeal, other than as found in Addendum A to Appellant's 
Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS/STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Brixen & Christopher Architects, P.C. is a well-respected local architectural 
firm. In January, 2000 the State served a Civil Investigative Demand against Brixen & 
Christopher, in which it declared that Brixen & Christopher is a "target" of an antitrust 
investigation, seeking information from Brixen & Christopher which, if furnished, may 
be used "in a civil or criminal proceeding against you . . . " The CID states that the 
activities under investigation are: 
A combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade in the creation of door 
hardware specifications for public buildings and in the sale of door 
hardware for installation in public buildings in Utah. 
Brixen & Christopher has not engaged in any such combination or 
conspiracy, and the State has not put forward any facts to give rise to a reasonable 
cause to believe that it or any other architect has or that it was in possession of 
information pertaining thereto. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Brixen & Christopher Architects, P. C. ("Brixen") accepts the proposition, as 
enunciated by the Attorney General, that she must establish that she has "reasonable 
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cause" to believe that there is a violation of the anti-trust laws and that the recipient of 
the civil investigative demand has knowledge concerning the violation. 
The trial court did not impose additional requirements to the statute as 
contended by the Attorney General in her brief. She simply explored what constitutes 
"reasonable cause" under the statute as interpreted by State v. Evans, 963 P.2d 177 
(Utah 1998), and found the "evidence" wanting. 
Contrary to the contention of the Attorney General that "substantial evidence" 
was presented to the trial court showing "agreements between a manufacturer and 
architects to create restrictive bid specifications that foreclosed competitors and raised 
prices to public entities" (brief, p. 6), the Affidavit of Mortensen, the State's sole 
evidence before the court, established no such agreements nor that the activities claimed 
constitute an antitrust violation. Rather, it speculated that such agreements might exist, 
but gave no detail such as was the case in Evans in which the affidavit contained 
substantial detail. 
ARGUMENT 
As required by statute, UCA §76-10-917, the State included in its CID a 
statement of the nature of the activities under investigation, constituting the alleged 
antitrust violation, which may result in a violation of the act and the applicable 
provision of law. The State alleged a combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade in 
the creation of door hardware specifications for public buildings. 
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When Brixen & Christopher challenged the CID, the State presented an 
Affidavit of its investigator, L. Del Mortenson. Mr. Mortenson's affidavit is attached 
hereto as Addendum A. Mr. Mortenson's Affidavit is the only evidence presented by 
the State in support of its CID. It does not contain objective, factual evidence alleging 
a combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. 
An antitrust plaintiff must prove three elements: an agreement among two or 
more persons or distinct business entities, which is intended to harm or unreasonably 
restrain competition, and which actually causes injury to competition. National 
Basketball Assfn v. SDC Basketball Club, Inc., 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987) certiorari 
dismissed Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Basketball Ass'n, 484 
U.S. 960, 108 S.Ct. 362, 98 L.Ed.2d 386. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-914(1), under which the State claims it is 
investigating, is essentially identical to Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
American Airlines v. Christensen, 967 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1992). The Utah legislature 
intends that the courts, in construing this act, will be guided by interpretations given by 
the federal courts to comparable federal antitrust statutes and by other state courts with 
comparable state antitrust statutes. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-926. 
Mr. Mortenson's affidavit does not contain any objective evidence of a 
conspiracy or restraint of trade. In addition, Mr. Mortenson's affidavit makes key, but 
incorrect, assumptions. 
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A. The Affidavit does not contain objective facts giving rise to 
reasonable cause to believe that a conspiracy in restraint of trade, as 
required by antitrust law, exists. 
An essential element of a claim under the Sherman Act based on an 
agreement imposing an unreasonable restraint on trade is proof of an unlawful 
objective. Willman v. Heartland Hosp. East, 34 F.3d 605, certiorari denied, 514 U.S. 
1018, 115 S.Ct. 1361, 131 L.Ed.2d 218 (8th Cir. 1994). To prove that an agreement to 
restrain trade exists between two or more persons, a plaintiff must demonstrate a unity 
of purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds, in an 
unlawful arrangement. City of Tuscaloosa v.Harcros Chemicals\ Inc., 158 F. 3d 548, 
(11th Cir. 1998) reh'g denied, 172 F.3d 884 (11th Cir. 1999). 
On page 13 of its Brief, the State identifies what it believes to be the restraint 
of trade in this case: "In the instant case, the architects submitted specifications 
(foreclosing the use of competitors' products) to public entities in exchange for free 
bid-drafting services provided to the architects by the manufacturer." The Mortensen 
affidavit does not support the State's assertion. But assuming, arguendo, that it does, 
the sentence does not allege a restraint of trade. There is no agreement alleged that the 
architect will use the specification prepared by the manufacturer. There is no unity of 
purpose alleged between the manufacturer and the architect. There is no allegation that 
the architect, having accepted the free specifications drafted, has any obligation with 
respect to the manufacturer. Mortensen's affidavit does not allege a singleJact to 
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support its key assumption that any architect submitted specifications in exchange for 
free bid-drafting services. 
Use of bid-drafting services does not violate any antitrust laws. It is merely a 
service, a form of salesmanship, and as such is pro-competitive. If other manufacturers 
of door hardware want to provide the same service, the antitrust laws do not prevent 
them from doing so. The State argues that architects performing work on state 
buildings are contractually prohibited from using "sales" or "agent" consultants. If so, 
and if the State believes that "sales" or "agent" consultants are being used, it is free to 
bring a breach of contract action against any party in violation. Breach of contract, 
however, does not rise to the level of an antitrust violation, and does not support the 
issuance of a CID which may only be issued in connection with an antitrust 
investigation. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-917. 
In order to prove a restraint of trade, the State must offer evidence of a 
conspiracy between the architects and the door hardware manufacturers or distributors. 
In order for there to be an agreement for purposes of §1 of the Sherman Act (and its 
Utah analog), there must be a unity of purpose of common design and understanding or 
a meeting of the minds in an unlawful agreement. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence 
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 , 104 S.Ct. 2731, 2742, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984); 
Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp., 117 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997). There 
is simply no objective evidence of any conspiracy or unlawful agreement in Mr. 
Mortenson's affidavit. Without that evidence, the CID is improper. 
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Paragraph 5 of Mr. Mortenson's affidavit states "I believe that petitioner's 
architectural firm might be a party to agreements or combinations which have the effect 
of suppressing price competition in the market for the public bidding of door hardware 
to be installed in public building projects in Utah. This belief is based on my 
experience in investigating antitrust violations and the following additional 
information." That architects "might" be a party to agreements or combinations is not 
evidence. Mr. Mortenson's "belief" based on his experience, if evidence at all, is 
subjective, not objective. 
The "following additional information" he refers to in his affidavit is a 
generic discussion of how he perceives architects work with manufacturers and 
distributors of door hardware as they develop plans and specifications. He discusses 
what he perceives is the possibility of improper conduct. He cites no specific instance 
in which the possible improper conduct has occurred. He suggests that if the architect 
uses the manufacturer or distributor to help him write the door hardware specifications, 
it opens the arrangement to abuse, but he cites no specific instance where such abuse 
has occurred. Further, he does not allege that an agreement to restrain trade exists, and 
omits the possibility that no such abuse occurs. 
In paragraph 15 of Mr. Mortenson's affidavit he says that there are many 
situations where specifications have contained "no substitution" provisions for door 
hardware which resulted in increased costs to the public agency. Again, he cites no 
specific instance. The fact, if true, is not evidence of the existence of a conspiracy. 
-7-
A large part of Mr. Mortenson's affidavit is devoted to a discussion of 
economic theory as to what might happen if the specification writers (read 
manufacturers and distributors) were to engage in unlawful conduct, but he does not 
cite any specific instance where such results have occurred. In addition, that discussion 
of economic theory contains no evidence of an agreement in restraint of trade. 
Mr. Mortenson advances the idea in paragraph 8 of his affidavit that 
architects on public buildings have an economic incentive for public project costs to 
escalate because " . . . fees paid to architects for their work on public building 
projects in Utah are a percentage of the total cost to construct or remodel the building." 
This is incorrect, at least in the case of contracts entered into by DFCM, the 
administrative body responsible for overseeing the construction of public buildings. 
(Affidavit of Myron Richardson to which is attached a form of Agreement with 
architects used by the State of Utah, R. 44) Architects' fees for the State of Utah's 
public work, and most, if not all, other public work, are agreed to prior to the architect 
undertaking the work. Once agreed to, the fees are not affected by the cost of the 
work, whether the cost is more or less than the amount originally budgeted for the 
project. 
Article 11.1 of the standard form Agreement governs how the State 
compensates architects. The State sets a budget for a building. Based on the State's 
budget, it then sets a fee to be paid the architect. The Agreement refers to this as "a 
lump sum fee." Once that lump sum fee is set, the architect does not get any extra 
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money, no matter how high the cost of the finished building. The lump sum fee is set 
before the project documents are prepared and before the door hardware specifications, 
or any other specifications, are considered. 
At oral argument below, the State switched its theory on this point from that 
expressed by Mr. Mortenson. Faced with the fact that architects are paid a lump sum 
fee, the State argued that use of consultants relieves architects from the burden of 
preparing specifications. (R. 84:19) 
However, architects on public projects in Utah have a strong incentive to 
keep costs down. Article 5.2 of the Agreement states that if the lowest bona fide bid 
by a responsible contractor satisfactory to the State exceeds by more than five percent 
the total construction cost of the project as set by the State, then the Architect shall, at 
its sole cost and expense, revise the drawings and specifications so that the total 
construction cost of the project will not exceed the total construction cost set by the 
State by more than 5 %. Thus, if the use of consultants would increase door hardware 
costs, architects would be served economically by avoiding them. 
Mr. Mortenson1 s affidavit simply fails to give any objective evidence that 
Brixen & Christopher, or any other architect, was involved in a conspiracy or unlawful 
objective. The State refers to a "manufacturer-architect" conspiracy. The evidence 
does not support such a broad use of the term. In paragraph 25 of his affidavit, Mr. 
Mortenson describes the alleged "Restriction of Trade". He says that it "appears" that 
the "agreements" by which architectural firms permit manufacturers' representatives to 
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write specifications for door hardware to be included in bids for public buildings in 
Utah are restraining trade by preventing other brands from being qualified to be 
included in bids by contractors and by preventing other suppliers from competing 
against the manufacturer's authorized distributors. This statement contains a huge, 
speculative logic jump. The conclusion is not justified by the "appearance". There is 
also no statement that anyone has engaged in a conspiracy. 
The State makes the curious argument that "the sufficiency of the State's 
evidence should be evaluated, not its accuracy." Inaccurate information is insufficient. 
Perhaps more to the point, assumptions are insufficient. Mr. Mortenson's affidavit 
incorrectly assumes that architects have an incentive to increase prices. It assumes with 
no evidence that there is a conspiracy between architects and door hardware suppliers. 
The difficulty with Mr. Mortensen's affidavit is that it contains a long list of 
generic assumptions, mainly speculative, subjective assumptions, about the possibility 
of unlawful activities conducted by a number of unnamed parties. The conclusion he 
reaches in Paragraph 25 is an amalgam of unsupported, speculative facts without any 
specificity. In contrast with the Evans case, on which the State relies in support of its 
CID, there are no specific facts to tie Brixen & Christropher to the possible agreements 
between unnamed persons. 
Unlike Mr. Mortenson's affidavit, the affidavit of the investigator in Evans v. 
State contained objective facts of a conspiracy. It stated that there were only two radio 
stations that ran local advertising in the Uintah Basin. A father owned the station in 
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Roosevelt and his son worked as general manger of the station in Vernal. The stations 
had identical prices. The stations offered discounts for merchants who were willing to 
advertise on the stations in both towns. Father and son joined in common ownership of 
land and buildings belonging to the two radio stations. Mr. Mortenson's affidavit is 
devoid of such facts. 
On page 11 of his 11 page affidavit, Mr. Mortenson describes "Relevant 
Information Possessed by Petitioner." Paragraph 26 says that based on a visit to the 
State Division of Facilities and Construction Management, Mr. Mortenson is aware that 
Brixen & Christopher performs architectural services on public buildings. This is 
hardly an indicia of possible culpability. Paragraph 27 says that in June, 1999, Mr. 
Mortenson sent a questionnaire to a number of architectural firms including Brixen & 
Christopher, and that Brixen & Christopher did not respond voluntarily. Failure to 
respond to a voluntary questionnaire is not evidence of a conspiracy. 
Neither of those paragraphs suggests that Brixen & Christopher is involved 
in, or knows anything about, an antitrust violation. The paragraphs give no objective 
evidence that Brixen & Christopher engaged in any of the activities complained about. 
The State also relies upon State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805 (Utah App. 
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) to the effect that the bribery 
of a corporate officer to induce that officer to select one service provider over its 
competitors can amount to an antitrust violation. The State analogizes that holding to 
the conduct of architects accepting free services from hardware manufacturers in 
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creating specifications that will prevent competitors from qualifying for the bid as a 
group boycott. Of course, the State makes no allegation that Brixen & Christopher (or 
any other architectural firm) has accepted bribes. There is nothing in the affidavit to 
show that the architects, individually or collectively, create specifications to stifle 
competition. 
B. The State has failed to marshal the evidence in support of Judge 
Lewis' ruling. 
In evaluating the propriety of a CID, a court must apply the standard of 
Evans to the facts in the case. Evans at 183. Judge Lewis did so, and the State now 
challenges that factual application. However, to successfully challenge a factual 
finding, appellants must marshal all evidence supporting the finding and then 
demonstrate that despite the evidence the finding is so lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence, and, thus, clearly erroneous. State in the 
Interest ofG. V., et al v. State, 916 P.2d 918 (Utah App. 1996). 
In this case the State has made no effort to marshal the evidence in support of 
Judge Lewis' decision. This evidence includes the Affidavit of Myron Richardson, in 
which he provides evidence that architects in Utah do not have any economic incentive 
to inflate door hardware prices. It also includes the admission against the State's 
interest that, although Brixen & Christopher is a named target in this investigation, the 
State has no evidence that Brixen & Christopher has committed any wrongdoing. (R. 
84: 13). 
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C. The State failed to show that Brixen & Christopher possesses 
information relevant to the State's investigation. 
The State's CID was properly dismissed because the State failed to show 
reasonable cause that any violation of the antitrust laws occurred. It was also properly 
dismissed because the State failed to show that Brixen & Christopher violated the 
antitrust laws or possessed information relevant to the State's investigation.. 
Judge Lewis was troubled by the State's failure to show reasonable cause that 
Brixen & Christopher had committed an antitrust violation. She recognized the interest 
of the State in keeping information confidential. She also recognized that "the plaintiffs 
have an interest, too, in being free from improper notice and orders that to an ordinary 
citizen are extraordinarily frightening and inappropriate unless they are founded on 
facts." (R. 84: 16) 
The State argues that it need not demonstrate reasonable cause to believe that 
Brixen & Christopher was violating the law. It cites no authority for its position other 
than its interpretation of the CID statute. The statue does, however, require that the 
Attorney General show that the information sought is relevant to the claimed violation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-914(7)(b)(ii) When a CID is issued to a target of an 
investigation requiring it produce its documents (which may be used against it), it 
logically follows that the statute requires the State to show that there is reasonable 
cause to believe the target has violated the antitrust laws. The State must show that the 
information it seeks is relevant to Brixen & Christopher's suspected violation. 
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In this case the State has made it very clear that Brixen & Christopher is a 
target of its investigation. (R.5, 18) The CID tells Brixen & Christopher that "Any 
documents or materials produced in response to this Civil Investigalive Demand may be 
used in a civil or criminal proceeding against you or anyone else." (R.5, 14) The State 
here is not seeking someone else's documents which might be in Brixen & 
Christopher's possession. It seeks Brixen & Christopher's own documents about its 
own conduct with the purpose of holding Brixen & Christopher liable. (R. 7 and 8) 
Judge Lewis prompted the State to provide her with information about the 
connection between the alleged violation and the information in the possession of 
Brixen & Christopher. The State was unable to do so. At oral argument, the State 
merely posited that if an architectural firm uses outside consultants they must use 
consultants affiliated with manufacturers and distributors and that Brixen & Christopher 
"does a fair amount of work for the State." (R. 84:24) When asked if there was any 
documentary evidence to support its allegation, the State responded that it had not 
provided any, but relied upon Mr. Mortenson's affidavit. (R. 84: 22) 
The State admits that it has no evidence that Brixen & Christopher has 
violated the antitrust laws. Footnote 6 of its brief reads: 
While in this case Brixen & Christopher is suspected of allowing 
this manufacturer to help write its bid specifications, the State does 
not yet have proof of that fact. This is the type of information 
sought in the CID issued to Brixen. Judge Lewis expressed her 
belief that the State's evidence did not show a violation by Brixen. 
But a showing of misconduct by a CID recipient is not a 
prerequisite to enforcing a CID. 
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(emphasis added). 
Judge Lewis correctly set aside the Civil Investigative Demand ("CID") 
issued by the State of Utah against Brixen & Christopher Architects, P.C. because she 
decided that the State's affidavit before her did not provide sufficient facts or objective 
evidence of conspiracy or restraint of trade by architects, particularly by Brixen & 
Christopher. 
D. Judge Lewis properly applied the law. 
The State implies that Judge Lewis would not allow it to explain at oral 
argument the reasoning and application of Evans. The record belies the implication. 
Before oral argument, Brixen & Christopher's Motion to Set Aside Civil Investigate 
Demand had been fully briefed, with both sides explaining their views of Evans. Judge 
Lewis expressed that she was already familiar with the case law, and asked the State to 
provide a factual nexus to the principles of Evans. She also allowed the State to have 
the last word and speak to any issues of its choice. The State asked if it could explain 
the Evans decision and its implications. Judge Lewis agreed. The State proceeded to 
explain Evans fully. (R. 84: 29-31) Judge Lewis understood and applied Evans; she 
merely decided that the material presented to her did not satisfy the Evans standard. 
A fair reading of the transcript of the hearing in this case leads to the 
conclusion that Judge Lewis was concerned about two things. First, the State had 
named Brixen & Christopher as a target of its antitrust investigation when in fact, as the 
State admitted at oral argument, Brixen & Christopher is not a target. (R. 84: 9) 
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Second, Mr. Mortenson's affidavit lacked sufficient factual specificity to reasonably 
conclude that there had been an antitrust violation. Under Evans, Judge Lewis' 
decision is entitled to a measure of discretion, and should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
In paragraph 4 of Mr. Mortenson's affidavit he advises he has talked to over 
20 individuals familiar with the door hardware business. One would think he could 
come up with some specific fact to support the assumptions he has made in his 
affidavit. The affidavit is replete with words such as "appears", and "if" such an event 
occurred, or that a distributor or manufacturer "may" offer services. 
The speculative script that the State draws, in essence is this: 
Architects prepare plans and specifications for public buildings. In 
order to do so, they obtain information from various suppliers of 
products to be used in a building, including door hardware. It is to the 
architect's advantage to increase the cost of the building, because by 
doing so he increases his fee. Door hardware manufacturers take 
advantage of this fact by writing the specifications for the architect, free 
of charge, inserting the manufacturers' own product to the exclusion of 
others, thus reducing competition. 
The difficulty is that this entire scenario is speculation. There are no 
instances to justify the conclusion that architects succumb to the blandishments of the 
door hardware manufacturers and distributors. In fact, the so-called motivation for 
architects to do so is wrong; at least in the State of Utah contracts, and in most others, 
the change in the cost of a building from the budget does not result in an adjustment of 
the fee. 
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It is said that the threshold necessary to find "reasonable cause" under the 
Civil Investigative Demand statute is a low one. We submit that if the basis for the 
State's issuance of a CID in this case is upheld, the standard is non-existent. The CID 
is particularly offensive when it describes Brixen & Christopher as a "target" of the 
investigation, warning that material produced may be "used in a civil or criminal 
proceeding against you . . .", a kind of civil Miranda warning. The issuance of this 
CID is an improper intrusion on Brixen & Christopher and should be set aside. 
Dated this _jl day of October, 2000 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
By:_ 
Hardin A. Whitney 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
By /2& h [ lii Robert G. Wing Attorneys for Petitioner and Appellee 
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Jan Graham 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
Salt lake City, UT 84114-0872 
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R.WAYNE KLEIN #3819 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM «1231 
Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South Fi;.;. ,; „>or 
Box 140872 
Salt Lake City, U l »4i i4-ub72 
Telephone: (801) 366-0358 
Facsimile: (801) 366-0315 
Attorneys for Respondent 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BRIXEN & CHRISTOPHER ) 
ARCHITECTS, PI1 a I Jtah ) 
Professional Corporation ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
STATE Ol- -...,.. ] 
Respondent. ] 
\
 AFFIDAviTOF 
> L. DEL MORTENSEN 
I ( u»w ." • t 
) Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
STATE OF ITAH ) 
i 'u l 'NTYO : -• • • 
L. DEL MORTENSEN, being first duly sworn, deposes on his oath and states: 
1 
Affiant 
1.' I am a Special Agent and antitrust investigator for the Utah Attorney General's Office. I 
have investigated business or white collar crime KM .>\ei J.-\ e^ai>. . ~.\. -JC:: .I> IL.IK -
specifically In investigate antitrust violations for the past P/2 years. During those VA 
years, I have participated in the investigation of several antitrust violations. I have 
received specialized training in the inv estigatioi 1 of antiti 1 1st i iolatioi is I am 1 a cei tified 
peace officer for the State of Utah and currently hold the rank of Lieutenant. 
2. I am the investigator assigned to the investigation at issue in this matter and have 
1 . W:L--._ * 1 iJniji 1 1 Ilk issuance ol lln; uuil in\ estiti;ifi\e 
demands in this matter. 
Background of this Investigation 
on door hardware that could be bid on a building project for a school district in Southern, 
I Jtah. Since that time, the investigation has expanded u- ni .uje inc. ;o; p,n .„;\ 1.;..^.; 
consti 1 iction projects ai 31 ind the state -
4. During this investigation, I have interviewed over twenty individuals familiar with the 
sale ol door hardware \ u linking loi insLilliilion in fiiililiiu InuMimj I hr w In nluals 
interviewed include representatives of a major manufacturer of door hardware, 
distributors of door hardware, school district officials, architects, and the Utah Division 
2 
ot I iK ilities and Construction Management (DFCM). In addition, I have reviewed 
documents received from a Utah college, school districts, and DrCM as well is 
documents ictened In in \n>tl(l ik in lulu iui il In u pin iJ nil 1 I i il IU imti * 
Demands issued to the architectural firms. 
5. I believe that petitioner's architectural firm might be a party to agreements or 
cMiihiikilii II s Inch li i1 III II I 1 np| K iii^ i in ( Minptliliui ii Ih i iih I I i the 
public bidding ol door hardware to be installed in public building projects in I itah 1 his 
belief is based on my experience in investigating antitrust v iolations and the following 
d M i l l il I i l t n i n i ill i 
Role of An lull i I in Bids for Construction of Public Buildings 
6. School districts and other owners ol public buildings general!) select an architectural linn 
U desun the building to be built Among other tasks, the architect is responsible tor 
identifying the door hardware needed for Ihe building, such as door closers, exit de\ ices 
(trash bat ), and locking devices Ihe aichitccl is p ud In I ill >pu IIILIIIIIH c 
included in the construction bid for the public building. The goal of having specifications 
drafted and the bidding process is to obtain as much competition as possible for products 
ni< (Mine (IK spuiin ihoii I In < umpi hlmn is ilrsii»itril lo i itsmt linings mil low pnu 
for the public aeenev. 
7. The owner ol the public building relies on the aichitect to a) have the expertise to draft 
3 
door" ha r :i * • are specifications that ^ * ill n leet the needs of the building owner, bi be 
completely objective in the drafting of specifications so no particular manufacturer or 
distributor will be favored without a justified reason for iue ; • ? c: v11 * e 
improper : i i indisclosed alliances with interested manufacturers or distributors, and d) 
draft specifications that w ill result in as much competition as possible for the purchase of 
door hardware. 
8. It is my understanding that the fees paid to architects for their work on public building 
projects in Utah are a percentage of the total cost to construct or remodel the bui.ldi.ng. 
Conversely, if an architect, through its effort, reduces the cost of some components of the 
• building, the architect's fees will, be lower. 
9. hi 'HiiK' t.\<se> i kiiUini' mwu i m n iron's) .i \ nf iin hi.uiii of door hardware because 
that brand is already in use in other buildings owned by the entity. However, in many 
cases, the public agency does not request that the architect limit the clooi 1: lard s\ are 
*' -" ;•- •'• certain brands. In these cases, the buildinu owner relies on the expertise 
of the architeci i*» viraft specifications that will deliver products that meet the needs of the 
agency, at tl i,.e low est. possible pi ices. 
Spec-W riting (Consultants 
-• lien ihe architect is engaged by the public agency to create construction plans and door 
4 
the architect to draft door hardware specifications. 
11. Commercial sources, such as "Master spec" computerized specifications, are available to 
•architects as they draft specifications for door hardware. In some cases, however, the 
• building owner may have needs that are not easily adapted from the commercial sources, 
or the architect may not feel that she has the expertise (or does i lot w ant to s v 
time) to personalize the specifications for the public agency. 
12. In 1 ;tah. Nome architects write their own dn«»r hardware specifications However, a large 
f . : - • ; , - . . . . ' ' ' 
services of outside consultants for assistance in drafting these specifications. Hie 
complexity of door hardware specifications encourages architects to use outside 
coi ISI iltants 
13. There are no independent door hardware specification \\ liters in Utah All specification 
writers are paM ..aha ••- raanuiacturers oi o> ^>ii.---utorso. ^.vn iuudwan. '^r 
example. ::>i:ie of t h e la rgest manufacturers of door hardware in the country has enLM/.cd 
two persons in Utah whose sole task is to assist architects in writing door hardware 
writer is always affiliated with either a manufacturer or a distributor seeking to sell 
certain brands of door hardware. 
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favor the brand sold by that manufacturer or distribu?, r n is miikely that the architect 
will change the specifications and is even more unlikci v ma; the building owner v,;: 
architects not disclosing to building owners when the architect has engaged the services 
of outside spec writers. 
1 I 1;; • itv • e stigatioi i has i incov ered many public building bids where the door hardware 
specifications are written without the option for substitution '.'"no sub"\ so that only 
certain products w ill qualify for the b .: in -.onic <>; lose ca -es. :. .,:,;.a; o v\ tier has 
requested that the limitation be included. However, this does not explain all of the spec 
limitations. The investigation conducted to date indicates that a substantial number of 
brands which would qualify under the bid, b) were not requested by the building owner, 
and c) resulted in the public agency paying higher prices than would have been the case 
Dthei w ise 
16. ' While these brand-specific specifications may include the phrase "or equal," other brands 
• are at a distinct dL-,aw\ jr.uge in getting their products approved for the bid. E \ en if 
another brand is of equivalent or superior quality, the manufacturer or distributor of that 
brand must take the time and effort: to prove, to the satisfaction of the architect, that the 
6 
pi odi ict is c f eqi li/v alent :ji lality I his i eqiiii es effort and expense not reqi lired ot the 
brand which already is specified in the specifications. Finally, in some cases, ihe space of 
time between the issuance oi a Did and the wnw wnui bid responses are due .^  ^ :;-.\ 
,:iHV - -v •, A:\ : oid. rhus, the "or 
equal" designation puts am competing brands at a significant disadvantage in competing 
for a bid whose specilicatuins already identify only one brand. 
Manuf ac turer and Distributoi In\ oivement in Specification VV riling 
17. A large manufacturer of popular door hardware appears to have created a sophisticated 
system., for increasing tl le pi ices being paid b> pi lbli ;:: agencies ai id fc i in lakit lg it 
extremely difficult for other brands to be included in bids for public buildings. This 
manufacturer provides door hardware to its three Utah distributors according to a variable 
to be installed in a project for which bids have been requested, the three distributors can 
all buy the products from the manufacturer at that same wholesale price. If those bid 
specifications .irv liiiiilol so liiiii mils ilm" pimliicls < I liuil iiiuiiiiif RIHH I qnalil\ Ihe 
• distributors receive no discount, and, may purchase the door hardware at that wholesale 
price. If, however, the bid specifications are written in a way that more than one brand 
can qualify to provide door hardware, either by the use of performance specifications or 
because more than one brand, is listed, the manufacturer will grant to its distributors 
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significant discounts from,, thai wholesale price. I hi.< discount pcrinil, . ilic di^lnluilni , I 
offer the door hardw are to contractors bidding on Utah public buildings at a price 
significantly below the normal wholesale price. The discount by the manufacturer to the 
distributors may :\. ^ - . : . :y MI 
wholesale discounts result in a lower price for the public agency. 
18. Competing brands are significantly hampered in their ability to compete for door 
1: lardw ai e t ids Ii ideed. if the • ioc i har i1 \ ai e spa: i tin, alioi is 
sub), competitors cannot even qualify to bid. 
1 p T
 . addition to the manufacturer, Utah distribuiois oi that brand al>o ma\ oiler spec 
]
 ^ . - are offered to architects 
ior free. I he distributor covers the cost of writing door hardware specifications not oiily 
from the increased chances that hi.>,.»* au,, *,.> L, uv^en : :n j * 
ufacturer. This manufacturer has apolir ^ divine a bonus 
to a distributor that a) writes a specification that permits only that brand to quani v and b) 
actually wins the hid In L• 111• f11"« lli.il fii-Jin, I I Ins knur. », an h» iisvJ |,r nl'hu I! III. t ,>sli if 
offering spec writing services and to reward the distributor for getting that product 
placed. The manufacturer can afford to pay bonuses in cases such as this because its 
20. . I he bonus payments the distributor receives from the manufacturer are an. incentive for 
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the distributor's spec writers to write specifications favorable to this manufacturer's 
products. 
21. From my review of door hardware specifications for public projects, it appears that a 
clear majority of no-substitution specifications identify products of this manufacturer. 
No-substitution specifications for other brands are less common, and to my knowledge 
occur only when the building owner requests the limitation. 
22. A bid containing door hardware specifications limited to only one brand still will result in 
a certain level of limited competition. If the manufacturer succeeds in getting an architect 
to include specifications limited to its brand, there still are three distributors in Utah of 
that brand. Those distributors are competing to be selected to provide the door hardware 
to contractors building the new edifice. However, that competition only limits the 
amount of the markup being charged by the distributors. It does not provide competition 
on the wholesale price. Each of those distributors is paying the same "regular" wholesale 
price for the product. On the other hand, if other brands are included in the 
specifications, the public agency will get competition for the wholesale price as well as 
the competition among distributors. A brand-limited specification provides competition 
only for one level of the cost of door hardware and excludes competition on other levels. 
23. Because this dominant manufacturer's efforts to capture the door hardware market are 
focused on architectural firms and, to a lesser extent, on building maintenance 
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representatives, rather than on distributors, the distributors have less ability to deliver low 
bid prices. By using strategies which result in architects preparing increasingly restrictive 
bid specifications favoring its products, the manufacturer is ensuring its products will be 
sold, without discounts, regardless of which distributor wins the bid. 
24. In addition to brand-limited specifications, spec writers from this manufacturer and its 
distributors also frequently include requirements that the supplier of door hardware be a 
"factory direct" supplier. While this provision is written ostensibly to exclude "fly-by-
night" contractors and suppliers, it actually serves to protect the high margins of the 
authorized distributors of this manufacturer. This requirement prevents other reputable 
contractors from obtaining the door hardware from other sources at prices below those of 
the authorized distributors. 
Restriction of Trade 
25. It appears that the agreements by which architectural firms permit manufacturers' 
representatives to write specifications for door hardware to be included in bids for public 
buildings in Utah are restraining trade by preventing other brands from being qualified to 
be included in bids by contractors and by preventing other suppliers from competing 
against the manufacturer's authorized distributors. These restrictions result in public 
agencies paying higher prices for door hardware components of public buildings than 
would be the case in the absence of these restraints. 
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Relevant Information Possessed by Petitioner 
26. 
27. 
Based on a visit to DFCM, I am aware that Petitioner, Brixen & Christopher, does 
perform architectural services on public buildings. 
In June 1999,1 sent a questionnaire to a number of architectural firms in the Salt Lake 
area, including Petitioner, seeking information to assist us in this investigation. Petitioner 
failed to respond to the questionnaire or provide any information voluntarily. 
Further, Affiant saith not. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CECILIA D. MILLER 
160 East 300 South. 5th Fir. 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84114-0872 
My Commission Expires 
January 9. 2003 
STATE OF UTAH 
'A 
L. DEL MORTENSE 
"^UZU^IL^J 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 22nd day of February, 2000. 
ulinuUtoifr 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
u 
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